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Introduction: A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991
Roger Clegg*
This symposium will explore the issues surrounding the enactment and early
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' The first article, by Glen D.
Nager and Julia M. Broas, discusses the key enforcement issues that have already
arisen under the Act. The next two articles discuss the two issues which
principally earned the legislation the label "quota bill": C. Boyden Gray
analyzes its treatment of so-called disparate impact claims, and Professor John
0. McGinnis explores the ways the legislation seeks to limit challenges to racial
preferences. The last two articles deal with less widely-known but still very
important provisions of the statute. R. Gaull Silberman focuses on alternative
dispute resolution, which is likely to become increasingly important in response
to the greater litigation spawned by the Act's other provisions. Professor Nelson
Lund discusses the coverage of the federal government---especially Congress-as
an employer; his article is especially valuable for its "public choice" insights into
the kind of civil rights legislation that was, and in the future is likely to be,
enacted. The symposium's epilogue makes some broader observations about the
future of civil rights issues in this country.
The purpose of this introduction is twofold: to offer a peek at what the
other authors say in their respective chapters, and to weave that into a history of
the legislation's enactment.
1. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS
The impetus for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a series of six decisions
handed down by the Supreme Court in May and June of 1989.2
The decision that provoked the most legislative controversy was Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio. " In 1971, the Court had ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* B.A., Rice University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1981. The author was Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, from 1987-91. He is now vice
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1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C.).
2. In January 1989, the Court announced its decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), striking down as unconstitutional a municipal ordinance that
awarded city contracts on a racially preferential basis. This seventh decision was also unpopular with
the civil rights groups. But because the decision was constitutional and not merely statutory, it was
never included in the omnibus civil rights bill.
3. 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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Co.4 that if an employment practice has a disparate impact on members of
minority groups and there is no proven "business necessity" for the practice, that
suffices as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' even if no
discriminatory intent is alleged or proved. Clearly this doctrine raises a great
danger of requiring employers to hire by quotas. If "disparate impact" can be
shown casually by any statistical imbalance, and if "business necessity" can be
shown only with great difficulty, an employer will be forced-either by litigation
or by the fear of litigation-to ensure that his "numbers" come out "right." As
Mr. Gray discusses in his article, this was precisely the way the federal civil
rights bureaucracy proceeded to enforce Griggs, in particular through its Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.6 Thus, by the time United
Steelworkers v. Weber7 was briefed a few years after Griggs, it was explicitly
argued to the Court that reverse discrimination had to be allowed under Title VII
because this was precisely what Griggs required.'
In Wards Cove, the 5-4 majority sought to relieve-or at least not further
build-this quota pressure. The Court held that, for purposes of showing a
disparate impact, the "proper basis for the initial inquiry" is "between the racial
composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the persons holding
at-issue jobs" rather than between one part of the employer's work force and
another. 9 This part of the Court's holding-which seems unassailable by any
common sense standard-was never challenged in Congress, although it is worth
noting that both the Ninth Circuit and four dissenting justices rejected it.
The Court went on to address three especially important additional issues in
order to provide guidance to the lower courts on remand. All three of these
issues were addressed in the ensuing legislation, as discussed at length in Mr.
Gray's article.
First, "[a]s a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the
application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the
disparate impact under attack."'. In other words, the plaintiff cannot simply
point to a racial imbalance and then require the employer to justify everything
he does that may contribute to that imbalance. Second, with respect to business
necessity, "the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."'" Thus, the
employer need not show that the challenged term or condition-which, bear in
mind, is not alleged to have been intentionally discriminatory, but only to have
had a disparate impact-is absolutely essential to his business. Third, the Court
4. 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. C,. 849 (1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1993).
7. 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
8. Br. for Pet'r, at 13-22, 49-50; Br. for the U.S. and EEOC, at 24-25.
9. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51. 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989).
10. Id. at 657, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
11. Id. at 659, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (citations omitted).
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held that, while "the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a
business justification for his employment practice," nonetheless "[t]he burden of
persuasion ... remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff."' 2
A week after Wards Cove, the Court announced its decisions in Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc.'3 and Martin v. Wilks.' Lorance held that the
statute of limitations period for challenging an allegedly discriminatory and
unfavorable change in an employee's contractual seniority rights-which were
not discriminatory on their face or as currently applied-began when the new
system was adopted, rather than when the employee was actually demoted
pursuant to the seniority system.'"
In Wilks, the Court held that white firefighters were entitled to bring an
action against a city and county, challenging the legality of hiring and promotion
quotas which had been adopted pursuant to an earlier consent decree entered
after black firefighters had sued the local governments. The trial court had
barred the suit, holding that the "impermissible collateral attack" doctrine
immunizes parties to a consent decree from discrimination charges by nonparties
to the decree for actions taken pursuant to it. A 5-4 majority of the Supreme
Court, however, held that white firefighters could not be barred from challenging
the deal struck at their expense between the local governments and the black
firefighters. "This ... is part of our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court.""16 The Wilks decision, and the part of the
1991 legislation that addressed it, are discussed in detail in Professor McGinnis's
article.
A fourth controversial decision was Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.7
It involved the proper construction of Section 1981 of Title 42, which then read:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens ....
Thirteen years earlier, in Runyon v. McCrary,8 the Court had held that Section
1981 prohibited one private party from refusing to contract with another because
12. Id.
13. 490 U.S. 900, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
14. 490 U.S. 755, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
15. The vote in Lorance was 5-3. Justice O'Connor did not participate, and Justice Stevens tiled
a separate concurrence in which he said he was joining the Court's opinion because it correctly
applied prior opinions, although he believed those prior opinions were wrong. Lorance, 490 U.S.
at 913, 109 S. Ct. at 2269.
16. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762, 109 S. Ct. at 2185 (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4449. at 417 (1981)).
17. 491 U.S. 164, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
18. 427 U.S. 160, 196 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
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of race. The threshold issue in Patterson was whether Runyon should be
reconsidered-i.e., whether Section 1981 prohibited wholly "private" discrimina-
tion at all. The Court decided it would not overturn Runyon. 9 This left open
the specific question presented in Patterson, namely whether racial harassment
violated Section 1981. In another 5-4 decision, the Court determined that it did
not, since the statute did not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation
of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established
contractual obligations.
It is odd that Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins0 would be the fifth decision
prompting a legislative response, since at the time it was generally hailed as a
victory by the civil rights groups. 2' In it, the Court set out the standards for
deciding "mixed motive" cases. The plaintiff, a female accountant, alleged that
she had been denied a partnership because of her sex, but the evidence developed
at trial indicated that management had both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory
reasons for its decision. The Supreme Court was splintered in the case and there
was no majority opinion. Nonetheless, a majority of the Justices agreed that
where direct evidence was presented that illegal discrimination was a substantial
factor in an employment decision, the burden of proof would shift to the
employer to prove that the same decision would have been reached even if this
illegitimate criterion had played no part in the decision.
The final 1989 decision targeted by the civil rights groups was Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes.22 It was included in their omnibus
bill, but was not addressed in the legislation that finally passed. The issue in
Zipes was whether a nondefendant intervenor-here, the collective-bargaining
agent for other flight attendants who might be hurt by the relief sought-could
be required to p%.y the attorney fees of an opposing class of plaintiffs alleging sex
discrimination. Title VII provides that a "court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee .. . ."" The Court had earlier
held that this was best interpreted to require payment of fees as a matter of
course by defendants to prevailing plaintiffs,24 but to prevailing defendants by
plaintiffs only if the lawsuit had been "frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation., 25 The Court in Zipes-once more, by a 5-4 vote-held that the
losing intervenors could be required to pay the prevailing party's attorney fees
19. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
20. 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
21. Practitioners See Price Waterhouse Ruling As Major Weakening of Employer Position, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), May 3, 1989; James H. Rubin, Women's Rights Groups Hail Supreme
Court Workplace Ruling, Associated Press wire story, May 2, 1989; see also Editorial, Promoting
'Fenininiry,'N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at 26 (the liberal Times, which consistently followed the civil
rights groups' lead during the legislative battle, called Price Waterhouse a "'balanced, sensible
judgment" that "made it easier for victims of employment discrimination to have their cases heard").
22. 491 U.S. 754, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
24. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 88 S. Ct. 964 (1968).
25. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 700 (1978).
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only if their position had been frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,
since they "have not been found to have violated anyone's civil rights."26
II. OPENING MOVES
The reaction to the Supreme Court's decisions was predictable and typified
the later debate: shrill condemnation by the civil rights groups, followed with
a tentative defense by the Bush administration. After a few weeks, however, the
public debate for the most part lapsed into a silence lasting over half a year.
During this time, the groups drafted the bill they would introduce and lined up
a long list of sponsors for it. The administration began preparing its response
to that bill, based on the rumors of what it would entail.
The bill the groups decided to draft and which their allies in Congress
introduced in early 1990 was enormously ambitious.2" Not only did it address
the four major statutory defeats before the Court in 1989 (Wards Cove, Wilks,
Patterson, and Lorance), as well as one minor one (Zipes), it even addressed a
case that the groups had claimed as a victory (Price Waterhouse), and several
pre-1989 setbacks.2 Most boldly of all, the bill sought to make damage awards
available in Title VII lawsuits, when before only equitable relief (primarily
injunctions and limited back pay) had been available. Not only was this a
dramatic expansion per se, it also meant that now most Title VII cases would be
tried to juries rather than decided by judges, since the Seventh Amendment
guarantees the right to a jury trial in cases where damages in excess of $20.00
are claimed.
This decision-to ask for essentially every civil rights reform on their wish
list-was the most important strategic call made by the civil rights groups during
the whole debate, and it turned out to be the correct one. It might have
backfired had the media or enough Senators and Representatives thrown up their
arms in disgust at the groups' greed, but they did not. Instead, the groups'
bill-and not the administration's much more limited version-was accepted as
the bill on the table for purposes of the debate. Even the most tangential
proposals remained in the bill until the very end, where some were used as
bargaining chips-and the most dramatic, the wholesale expansion of Title VII
to include damages and jury trials, actually became law.
When the announcement of this "Kennedy-Hawkins bill" was imminent, the
administration had to decide whether simply to oppose the bill or to counter-
propose a bill of its own. It decided on the latter course, for reasons of both
politics and principle. Politically, many in the administration argued that it was
26. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 762, 109 S. CI. at 2737 (citing Chrisfiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418,
98 S. Ct. at 698).
27. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
28. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I. 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 106
S. Ct. 1531 (1986); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986). See also
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S. Ct. 2494 (1987).
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essential for the administration's allies in Congress to be able to claim that, while
they had voted against Kennedy-Hawkins, nonetheless they had voted for a civil
rights bill, namely the President's. As a matter of principle, the administration
thought it untenable to oppose legislation that would simply vindicate the
position taken (unsuccessfully) by the Department of Justice itself before the
Supreme Court in two targeted cases from the 1988-89 Term. The Court had
interpreted Title VII more narrowly than the Department had argued as amicus
in the Lorance case, and Section 1981 of Title 42 more narrowly than the
Department had argued in the Patterson case. Thus, the administration proposed
a short bill that would amend Title VII to overturn Lorance, and amend Section
1981 to overturn Patterson and ensure that racial harassment claims could be
filed under that statute. 29 Little attention was paid to it.
The administration immediately found itself in a vulnerable position with
respect to the sexual harassment issue. If it was willing to amend Section 1981
so that victims of racial and ethnic harassment could get that statute's unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages, then why was it not also willing to support
legislation making the same damage awards available to victims of sexual
harassment? The answer was that such awards had never been available, and
that no one had even proposed such an amendment until after the 1988-89
Term-in which the Supreme Court had said exactly nothing about sexual
harassment. But this was a rhetorically limp response to those who clained the
administration was making women into "second class citizens."
The administration toyed with the idea of a free-standing bill on sexual
harassment to solve this problem. Ultimately, however, the administration
decided against this approach. After meeting with various civil rights leaders,
President Bush announced that he wanted a civil rights bill, but one that met
certain criteria: a provision for better harassment remedies, but also no quotas,
no procedural unfairness, no lawyer's bonanza, and no special treatment for
Congress (which had exempted itself from Title VII). 30
III. FAILED NEGOTIATIONS AND A VETO
Soon after the President's speech, Jeffrey H. Blattner of Senator Kennedy's
staff spoke with Assistant Attorney General John R. Dunne, who had just two
months earlier been sworn in to lead the Justice Department's Civil Rights
Division. A large meeting was set up in June 1990 between the relevant
administration officials (mostly from the White House and the Department of
Justice) and the various civil rights groups (who had agreed to be led by Mr.
Blattner).
29. 136 Cong. Rec. S1522 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990) (Sen. Hatch introduces the administration's
bill, "Civil Rights Protections Act of 1990," S. 2166). See Michael Isikoff & Ann Devroy, Civil
Rights Bill Veto Threatened, Washington Post. Apr. 5, 1990, at A25.
30. Remarks at a Meeting With the Commission on Civil Rights, 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
778 (May 17, 1990).
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It was a tense series of meetings. There were probably about fifteen people
from the administration who sat along one side of a long table in the Civil Rights
Division conference room, and as many people from the various civil rights
groups who sat along the other side. Boyden Gray and John Dunne sat side-by-
side in the center for the administration, facing Mr. Blattner. For many hours
over several days the two sides stated and argued their positions. It was all very
strained because for many on each side there were fundamental principles of
transcendent importance at stake, and the other side was viewed as not only an
adversary but an enemy. There was no real negotiation and certainly no
agreement. Ultimately, the civil rights groups angrily walked out. The two sides
were too far apart, and probably everyone who understood the stakes knew it.
Later that summer, Senator Kennedy had a series of meetings with then-
White House chief-of-staff John Sununu. These meetings came closer to
producing an agreement, at least on the Wards Cove issue, but ultimately failed,
too.3 ' Throughout the summer and into the fall the struggle continued. Senator
Nancy Kassebaum introduced a bill that the administration supported,32 but it
was completely unacceptable to the civil rights groups and their allies in
Congress. Congress passed the groups' bill instead," the President vetoed it,'
and the veto was sustained by a razor-thin one-vote margin in the Senate.35
IV. EARLY 1991: TRYING TO REDEFINE THE DEBATE
The first legislative item of 1991, H.R. I, was introduced on January 3 that
year.36 Instead of a move toward consensus, however, this bill actually widened
the distance between the administration and the original bill's supporters. The
administration knew it wanted to oppose this bill', but with what?
The administration was aware that, so long as the civil rights groups' bill
was the only one on the table, the bill's opponents were fighting an almost
hopeless defensive battle. The groups would continue pressing the bill, year after
year, until the-very tiny-additional political impetus that was needed to make
31. See 46 Cong. Q. Almanac 466 (1990); Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, 'Sunun Blinked,'
Washington Post, July 18, 1990, at A23.
32. Kassebaum Amendment No. 2131 to S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 136
Cong. Rec. S9786-87 (daily ed. July 16, 1990). A similar bill, also with administration backing, was
introduced in the House that summer by Rep. John LaFalce. Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute to H.R. 4000. 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1990).
33. 136 Cong. Rec. H9984-95 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990); see Tom Kenworthy, House Approves
Civil Rights Bill/Despite Changes, Veto Threat Stands, Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1990, at Al.
34. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990. 26 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1632 (Oct. 22, 1990).
35. 136 Cong. Rec. S16,562-89, S16,620 (daily ed. Oct. 24. 1990); see Helen Dewar, Senate
Upholds Civil Rights Bill Veto. Dooming Measure for 1990. Washington Post, Oct. 25. 1990, at Ai5.




the bill veto-proof appeared. The problem was, how could the groups' bill be
removed from the table?
There were two possibilities: to discredit decisively the groups' bill, or to
propose an administration alternative that succeeded in shifting the terms of the
debate.
The former strategy was essentially what the administration had been
following. And, indeed, it had been enormously successful (and accurate) in
characterizing the proposed legislation as "a quota bill" and a "lawyer's bonan-
za."37 Nonetheless, a large part of the bill's core constituency in both houses
remained committed to it. Early in 1991, the administration also tried to paint
the bill as unnecessary in all events. It released a detailed study that focused on
the lower court decisions applying Wards Cove, Wilks, and Price Waterhouse,
and argued that none of the three Supreme Court decisions was leading to unfair
results. 3 But the administration did not expend much effort in publicizing the
study, and it attracted little notice.
A similar pattern was followed in early 1991 with respect to an alternative
approach to improving the civil rights laws. Once again, much effort was expended
in formulation, but little in promotion.
There were, as a general matter, two sorts of alternative bills that the
administration might offer. The first it had already proposed, namely a version of
the groups' bill itself, with the most offensive provisions in it either scaled back to
an acceptable level or deleted altogether. The bill the administration had itself
proposed at the same time that the Kennedy-Hawkins bill was introduced-over-
turning Lorance and Patterson but doing nothing more-was the first. and most
limited such proposal; the bills introduced by Senator Kassebaum and Representa-
tive LaFalce, with the administration's support, were two others; and a bill
proposed by the administration itself at the time of the veto was the latest and most
elaborate.39
But the defects in this "dime-store me-tooism" were both political and
philosophical. As a political matter, it meant that the administration and its
supporters would inevitably be labeled as less in favor of "civil rights" than their
opponents. That charge was, of course, readily answerable-by pointing out that
the groups' quota bill was less consistent with the spirit of civil rights than the
administration's alternative-but, again, that had not seemed to shake a near veto-
proof majority in either house. The other political defect was that, over time, the
alternative bill was ratcheted closer and closer to the quota bill-"ratcheted"
because it was very difficult to take back any concession once made.
The philosophical defects were, to conservatives in the administration, even
more troubling. To them, it was laughable to suppose that Title VII or Section
37. See. e.g., supra note 30.
38. Memorandum from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to the
Attorney General (Feb. 7. 1991).
39. See Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Civil Rights Legislation, 26 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1631 (Oct. 20, 1990).
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1981 needed to be strengthened in any respect. To the contrary, even the pre-1989
status quo ante that the administration had said it was willing to codify had been
built by the most appalling judicial activism. Patterson's only defect was that it did
not go far enough, since no principled reading of Section 1981 could justify its
application to private employment contracts. 40 Wards Cove did not go far enough
either, since the whole notion of a "disparate impact" cause of action was poisonous
policy and ridiculous jurisprudence. 4' And Wilks, which allowed challenges to
racially preferential plans by its victims, was surely no more than a necessary
palliative, since the Court should have interpreted the plain language of Title VII
to bar all racial preferences to begin with. 42 Take away the Patterson, Wards
Cove, and Wilks provisions, of course, and not much of the civil rights bill was left.
Moreover, to conservatives the groups' bill fully captured everything that had
gone wrong with the civil rights movement after the passage of its landmark
legislation in the sixties. Not only did the civil rights lobby defend the patently
unfair system of racial and gender preferences it had-with bureaucratic and
judicial connivance-constructed, it was unable or unwilling to admit that systemic
discrimination no longer had any appreciable relevance to the real problems
confronting disadvantaged minorities. Thus, while the inner cities rotted, the civil
rights establishment devoted its considerable lobbying and fund-raising resources
to passing an absurd civil rights bill, encouraging its "constituency" to believe that
discrimination was the principal source of woe, rather than individuals' failure to
take responsibility for their own lives.
To conservatives, then, the alternative bill should not in its essentials be an
"antidiscrimination" bill at all. Rather, it should "empower" the disadvantaged-of
all races and ethnicities-to run their own schools, own their own homes, start their
own businesses, and cut through the layers of bureaucratic red tape that might keep
them from doing so. Not only would this give the administration's allies something
positive to votefor, and not only would this underscore the intellectual bankruptcy
of the civil rights groups, it was a major new part of their agenda that conservatives
were hoping the administration would press anyway. The elements of that plan
would include school choice, tougher anticrime measures, enterprise zones, home
ownership incentives, and greater local control over government programs. On
40. See supra text at notes 17-19; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-90, 96 S. Ct. 2586,
2603-04 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 186, 96 S. Ct. at 2602 (Powell, J., concurring); id.
at 192-214, 96 S. Ct. at 2605-15 (White, J., dissenting). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 449-80, 88 S. Ct. 2186. 2208-23 (1968) (Harlan. J., dissenting).
41. See supra text at notes 4-8; Michael Gold, Griggs' Foly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems,
and Origin of the Adverse lnxpact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation
for Reform, 7 Indus. Rel. L.J. 429 (1985).
42. See supra text at notes 7-8; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-55, 99 S. Ct.
2721, 2735-53 (1979) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting); id. at 216-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2734-35 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 642-44, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1457-58
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 647-48, 107 S. Ct. at 1460 (O'Connor. J.. concurring in the
judgment); id. at 657-77. 107 S. Ct. at 1465-75 (Scalia. J., dissenting). See also id. at 657. 107 S.
Ct. at 1465 (White, J., dissenting).
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February 27, 1991, President Bush announced such a plan, but that was essentially
the last anyone heard of it.
43
V. IMPASSE
In the spring, the Business Roundtable, led by AT&T chief executive Robert
C. Allen, tried to reach an agreement with the civil rights groups. These efforts
failed, too, with both the administration and other business leaders critical of the
proposals being discussed." Whatever its failures at promoting its own bill, the
Bush administration was becoming quite successful at blocking unacceptable
compromises by others. Indeed, tactically the Bush administration proved quite
skilled in fighting the proposed legislation andjustifying its refusal to accept it. But
the reason it needed this skill was because of the difficult constraints it had placed
on itself in its strategic concessions.
Thus, as we have seen, when the decisions first came down and the groups first
attacked them, the administration did not swiftly and decisively defend those
decisions and announce opposition to any attempt to overturn them. When the
Kennedy-Hawkins bill was first proposed, the administration did not simply oppose
it, but also proposed a bill of its own, overturning Patterson and Lorance. And,
later that summer, the administration said that it was willing to accept legislation
addressing Wards Cove and Martin v. Wilks and providing for enhanced monetary
awards in Title VII cases.
Each decision seemed like a good idea at the time it was made. But collective-
ly they forced the administration to draw and explain distinctions between the
Patterson-Lorance-Wards Cove-Wilks-more-money bill it was willing to accept and
the Patterson-Lorance- Wards Cove- Wilks-more-money bill it would not--distinct-
ions that were quite valid, to be sure, but Which would often appear to be pretextual
and which guaranteed that any minor misstep would dash the administration's
position on the quota rocks below.
In any event, ultimately Senator John Danforth was to succeed where others
had failed and broker a compromise bill between the administration and the civil
rights groups. The wisdom of this compromise, and indeed whether it was a
compromise at all rather than a victory for one side or the other, will never be
resolved." But Senator Danforth met with both sides, hammered out a bill, and
43. Remarks at a Meeting of the American Society of Association Executives, 27 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doe. 221 (Feb. 27, 1991). President Bush had earlier referred to similar "empowerment" items
on his agenda in his speech outlining his criteria for an acceptable civil rights bill, supra note 30.
44. Steven A. Holmes, Talks on New Rights Bill Divide Large and Small Companies, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 19, 1991, at B6; Paul A. Gigot, Big Business Shouldn't Sleep With the Enemy, Wall St. J., Apr.
19, 1991, at A14.
45. In this symposium alone, for instance, Mr. Gray claims victory for the administration, at least
on the Wards Cove issue; Professor Lund contends that the administration failed, albeit perhaps
deliberately, to accomplish its stated goals; and Mr. Nager and Ms. Broas conclude that, so far, there




then succeeded in selling it. For awhile, it was unclear whether either side-and,
in particular, the administration-would buy. But ultimately, in the fall of 1991,
an agreement was reached. How this came about is itself an unresolved mystery,46
but at least part of the answer may lie in a separate but parallel drama that unfolded
at the same time.
VI. BREAKTHROUGH
On the Friday and weekend of October 11-13, 1991, the nation sat riveted
before its television sets, watching the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings. That
event is beyond the scope of this introduction, but it was related to the proceedings
of the civil rights bill in several key respects. First, the ideological fault lines were
identical. Clarence Thomas was an anti-quota conservative, and this-greatly
aggravated by the fact that he was black-earned him the wrath of the civil rights
lobby. Second, what became the underlying issue of the hearings-sexual
harassment-was of course an issue in the bill as well. And third, the conservatives
won and the civil rights lobby lost-and in no small measure because of the efforts
of Senator John Danforth, Thomas's former boss and his principal defender in the
Senate.
Almost immediately after the hearings, the civil rights groups and the
administration reached agreement on a civil rights bill. The temptation to see a
connection between the two is irresistible. Is it valid, or is it a classic case of post
hoc, ergo propter hoc?
The temptation is strongest to see the connection as explaining some final
concession by the administration. President Bush was being the magnanimous
patrician in the wake of his victory, the explanation goes, and the WASP President
was never one with an instinct for the jugular on this issue anyway, and only too
eager to wash his hands of the groups' blood after the unseemliness of the Thomas-
Hill fight. For good measure, this theory also points to the ascendancy of David
Duke's candidacy for governor of Louisiana at the same time: President Bush
simply could not abide another race-charged national battle. Besides, he owed
Senator Danforth after the Thomas confirmation. So he told his lawyers to cut the
best deal they could and be done with it.
This is not an implausible scenario, and it has added credibility since even
conservatives might have rationalized cutting a deal at that time. The administra-
tion had been able to hold on for another year, but 1992-an election
year-loomed. It was easy to envision a handful of Senators and Representatives,
just enough to make the bill veto-proof, getting sufficiently skittish over the next
few months to sue for peace. Again, given the self-imposed constraints of the
administration, time was not on the side of the bill's opponents. And a bill passed
46. For one account, written by Senate staffers who worked for the adoption of the Danforth
compromise, see Peter M. Leibold et aL.. Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish-Civil Rights,
Quotas, and Disparate Inpact in 1991, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1043 (1993).
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over the President's veto would be significantly worse-substantively and
politically-than one he negotiated.
There is, however, an alternative scenario, namely that it was the civil rights
groups who felt under the most pressure to strike the best deal they could after the
Thomas-Hill hearings. Remember that these hearings were an unmitigated disaster
for them. Clarence Thomas was their worst nightmare, a black conservative on the
Supreme Court, and overwhelmingly the American people had believed him and
not their desperate hope to stop his confirmation, Anita Hill. And their relations
with their most important ally, Senator Danforth, were greatly strained after the
hearings. 7 If he insisted on further concessions, and if the groups were unwilling
to make them and this resulted in the loss of his (and other moderate Republicans')
support, then the administration really might be able to block the bill indefinitely.
And it was not quite true that the groups could bide their time forever. The
"quota bill" was turning into a public relations debacle. An internal survey by the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights showed that Americans largely viewed the
groups as special pleaders for preferential treatment for minorities, rather than
principled defenders of fairness; the results of survey, to the groups' embarrass-
ment, were leaked.4' And what if, as they had hoped to do, the administration and
its allies at some point succeeded in attaching a dramatically scaled-back version
of the bill as a rider to some piece of popular legislation, forcing an up-or-down
vote? The passage of such a bill might end decisively any hopes for the more
sweeping changes the groups' bill contemplated. So the groups faced considerable
pressure to strike a deal, too.
The two scenarios are not, of course, mutually exclusive. The political
calculus for both sides was altered after the Thomas-Hill hearings. Moreover,
President Bush should be taken at his word on this crucial point: he really did want
a civil rights bill all along.49 The hearings were not needed to change that.
VII. CONCLUSION
On the eve of the signing ceremony for the bill, conservatives in the adminis-
tration pressed for an anti-quota parting shot. They drafted a directive that the
President would sign along with the bill, which would have required a review of all
federal employment programs that included racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual
47. When the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights announced its opposition to the Clarence
Thomas nomination, Senator Danforth stated, "I do not think the support of the people of this country
for Clarence Thomas will be swayed by the action of a group of self-anointed professional activists."
Ruth Marcus. Civil Rights Coalition Finds Thomas Too 'Radical'for Court. Washington Post, Aug.
8, 1991, at A13.
48. Thomas B. Edsall, Rights Drive Said to Lose Underpinnings/Focus Groups Indicate Middle
Class Sees Movement as Too Narrow, Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1991, at A6; William J. Bennett, A
New Civil Rights Agenda. Wall St. J., Apr. I. 1991, at B12.
49. On this point, see Nelson Lund's article in this symposium, Congressional Self.Exemption
from the Employntent Discriniation Laws. 54 La. L. Rev. 1559 (1994).
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preferences, and the termination of those programs inconsistent with the new law
or with the principle of discouraging quotas and unfair preferences. Ultimately,
however, the idea was rejected." The bill was signed, with only a general
declaration in the signing statement that "[iut is extremely important that the statute
be properly interpreted-by executive branch officials, by the courts, and by
America's employers-so that no incentives to engage in such illegal conduct [i.e.,
'adopt[ing] quotas or unfair preferences'] are created."'"
To the inevitable questions, "Who won? Who lost?," the answer to both is,
even more than usual with compromises, "Both sides."
The civil rights groups passed a bill that, from their perspective, was certainly
a dramatic improvement on the law as it stood after the Supreme Court's decisions
in 1989. But it was nowhere near the wish list they had proposed. More
importantly, the debate over the bill together with the Thomas-Hill hearings made
abundantly clear that the civil rights groups had greatly diminished political capital
and essentially no moral authority left. For these lobbyists, there is no higher price.
President Bush, on the other hand, got a civil rights bill he could live with. The
trouble was, he set his sights too low. Had the administration been earlier, more
vigorous, and more principled in its opposition, it might have been able to defeat
passage of any so-called civil rights bill. Put another way: measured against the
benchmark of the original Kennedy-Hawkins bill, and given its self-imposed
restraints, the administration acquitted itself well; but measured against the
benchmark of where the law should have been and where it in fact ended up when
President Bush signed the bill in November 1991, the outcome was disastrous.
50. See Ann Devroy & Sharon LaFraniere, U.S. Moves to End Hiring Practices/Affirmative Action
Policies Targeted. Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1991, at Al; Ann Devroy, Presidet Signs Civil Rights
Bill/White Hotose Disavows Proposed Directive to End Affirmative Action. Washington Post, Nov.
22, 1991, at Al.
51. Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. at 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 1701,
1702 (Nov. 21, 1991). The signing statement also adopted as "'authoritative interpretive guidance"
the analysis of the bill introduced by Senator Robert Dole into the Congressional Record. Id. (citing
137 Cong. Rec. S15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991); id. S15.953 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991)).
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